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Bell v. Ozmint
332 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Fawts
In the early hours of September 1, 1998, the principal of West Franklin
Street Elementary School in Anderson, South Carolina, Dennis Hepler
(Hepler"), was found dead outside the school He had been shot twice. Sub-
stantial evidence linked William Henry Bell ("Bell") to the murder. Police
discovered Bell's fingerprints on Hepler's car, and neighborhood residents
observed Bell in the vicinity of the murder on the night of August 31 with John
Glen ("Glen") and Kevin Young ("Young").'
After police took him into custody, Bell offered four different statements.
In his most damning statement, Bell admitted that he and Glen sought to remove
the cassette player from Hepler's car that was parked outside the school. The
two heard the school door open and hid behind a wail with Young. As Hepler
emerged from the school, Young approached Hepler from behind and asked for
his wallet. Hepler complied with Young's request, and Young then shot him in
the back The gun jammed. Bell took the gun from Young, unjammed it, and
shot Hepler in the back of the head.2
The jury convicted Bell and recommended a death sentence; the trial judge
sentenced Bell to death? Bell exhausted his direct appeals.4 He unsuccessfully
sought relief in the state post-conviction relief ("PCR") court.' Bell sought a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court, but the court declined to grant habeas
relief.6 The district court did, however, grant a certificate of appealability
("COA") on each of his claims.7 Bell appealed the district court's denial of
habeas relief on the grounds that the district court applied the wrong standard
of review to his habeas petition, erred by denying his application for an eviden-
tiary hearing on juror impartiality, improperly denied his claim of prosecutorial
1. State v. Bell, 406 S.E2d 165, 167 (S.C. 1991).
2. Id
3. Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 231 (4th Cir. 2003).
4. Bd 406 SXE2d at 167; Bell v. South Carolina, 502 U.S. 1038, 1038 (1992) (mere)
(denying certiorar).
5. Bdl, 332 F.3d at 232.
6. Id
7. Id; see 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (allowing a circuit judge or justice to grant a
certificate of appealability, part of AEDPA).
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bias, and incorrectlydenied his claim that the prosecution exercised a peremptory
challenge in a racially biased fashion.'
I. Hdding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied relief on
each of Bell's claims.9 Because the PCR court's order amounted to an adjudica-
tion on the merits, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly
reviewed the PCRcourt's decision under 28 U.S.C S 2254(d). 10 Next, the Fourth
Circuit held that the PCR court's refusal to grant an evidentiaryhearing on juror
impartiality was not an unreasonable application of federal law because Bell
produced no evidence that the jury was subjected to any improper influence."
The Fourth Circuit found that Bell's prosecutorial bias claim lacked sufficient
evidence; therefore, it declined to grant relief on that claim. 2 Although the
Fourth Circuit criticized the Supreme Court of South Carolina's analysis of Bell's
Batson claim, it agreed that the claim was without merit."
IlL Anzsis
A. Sta~rda ,Reew
In the state PCR proceedings, after both parties submitted post-hearing
briefs to the state PCR court, the PCR court invited both parties to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 4 Bell declined to complywith
the court's request, but the State submitted a proposed memorandum and
order." After careful scrutiny, the PCR court incorporated significant portions
of the state's proposed order into its final judgment because of the proposed
order's intelligent and complete analysis of the issues. 6
8. Bd, 332 F.3d at 232. Bell also argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
an alleged threatening phone call made to an African American juror's husband. Id at 236. In
addition, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective. Id at 242. The Fourth Circuit declined
to grant relief on either claim. Id at 237, 244. Neither claim will be further discussed in this case
note.
9. Id at 231.
10. Id at 234; sw 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a federal court may only grant
habeas relief when a state court's decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States," or (2) "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding"; part of AEDPA).
11. Bdl, 332 F.3d at 236.
12. Id at 239.
13. Id at 241.





Bell argued that the district court should have made de novo findings of fact
and law and that it therefore erred by applying 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)'s deferential
standard of review to the PCR court's findings.17 Bell claimed that because the
PCR court substantially adopted the state's proposed order in its final order, the
PCR court failed to render a "decision within the meaning of Paragraphs (1) and
(2) of S 2254(d).""8 Byits terms, S 2254(d) only applies to state court decisions.19
Therefore, Bell reasoned, the district court erred by reviewing the state PCR
court's result under S 2254(d) because it was not a "decision."2
The Fourth Caruit found the PCR court's reasoning less than ideal but
noted that in Ywg v Ctoi it had already determined that a state court's adop-
tion of one party's proposed findings of fact constituted an adjudication on the
merits to which the terms of S 2254(d) apply.22 Bell sought to distinguish Ywog
by contending that the petitioner in Ywng only challenged the district court's
application of the standard of review found in S 2254(d) (1), while Bell claimed
that the district court errantly applied the standards of review in S 2254(d)(1) and
5 2254(d)(2) to his case. 3 The Fourth C-cuit found that this distinction was
without merit because Yung actually involved a challenge to the district court's
application of both prongs of the statute and the court in Yawgfound that both
were applied correctly.
24
B. In a n C arpeor Jwy
Bell argued that the PCR court should have held a hearing to determine
whether a fair and competent jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
decided his case.2" Upon learning of allegations that the jurors in Bell's trial
frequently drank alcohol with officers in the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division ("SLED") while sequestered, SLED investigated and issued a report on
17. Bd4 332 F.3d at 233; see28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000) (stating that a federal court may only
grant habeas relief when a state court's decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, dearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States," or (2) "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding"; part of AEDPA).
18. BeI 332 F.3d at 233 (citations omitted).
19. 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1)-(2) (limiting a federal court's abilityto issue writs of habeas corpus
with respect to state court decisions; part of AEDPA).
20. Big 332 F.3d at 233.
21. 205 F.3d 750 (4th Cir. 2000).
22. Bd4 332 F.3d at 233; seeYoung v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750, 755 n.2 (4th Ctr. 2000) (stating
that if a state court adopts one party's proposed order in a proceeding, then such an action is a
decision on the merits and S 2254(d) must be applied upon habeas review by a federal court).
23. B4 332 F.3d at 234.
24. Id
25. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury").
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those contentions.26 Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied
Bell's motion for a new trial based on that report, the PCR court allowed Bell to
depose several jurors, alternates, SLED officers, and individuals present at the
hotel bar during the times in question.27 The resulting affidavits indicated that
although the jurors and SLED officers drank together during the trial, the
officers exerted no improper influence on the jurors.S
Under the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, a juror's testimonyconceming
an earlier verdict is limited to the question of "whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."29 The PCR
court found that none of the evidence Bell gathered relating to the jury indicated
that the jurors were exposed to such an influence.3" The PCR court then granted
the State's motion to exclude the testimony regarding the juror's behavior while
sequestered.3
The Fourth Grcuit decided that the PCR court's declination to consider
further evidence of juror impropriety was not contrary to federal law.32 The
court noted that South Carolina Rule of Evidence 606(b) is identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b)." Furthermore, in Tamrvr UnihtState,34 the Supreme
Court decided that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) did not require a lower court
to hold a hearing into allegations of drug and alcohol abuse during trial." The
Fourth Crcuit noted that the allegations of juror incompetence in Trww, ingest-
ing drugs and alcohol which caused jurors to sleep during part of the trial, were
much worse than those in Bell's case.36 Therefore, the Fourth Crcuit held that
26. Bd, 332 F.3d at 234.
27. Id
28. Id at 235.
29. S.C R. EVID. 606(b) (restricting juror testimony concerning a prior verdict to questions
of extraneous prejudicial influence imposed on the jur).
30. Bd 332 F.3d at 235.
31. Id
32. Id at 236. Like the district court, the Fourth Circuit applied S 2254d)1) whenit decided
Bell's application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id at 234; se 28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (limiting
a federal court's power to grant habeas relief to cases when the state court's decision was "contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law"; part of AEDPA).
33. Bd4 332 F.3d at 235; sieFED. R. EVID. 606(b) (stating "a juror maytestify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror"); S.C R. EviD.
606(b) (identical phrasing).
34. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
35. Bd4 332 F.3d at 235; see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) (noting that
legislative history strongly implied "juror intoxication is not an 'outside influence' about which
jurors may testify to impeach their verdict").
36. Bd 332 F.3d at 235-36 (citing Tanne, 483 U.S. at 115-16).
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the state PCR court had not unreasonably applied federal law in declining to
consider further evidence on Bell's claim regarding the jury because federal law
only required such a hearing upon a showing of a prejudicial outside influence."
C Pra lo" Biz
Bell argued that the prosecutor who elected to seek the death penalty,
George Ducworth ("Ducworth"), did so out of racial prejudice." Bell asserted
that this decision violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Bell based his claim on a studybyProfessor Theodore Eisenberg
("Eisenberg").' The study showed that between 1979 and 1989 prosecutors in
Anderson County sought the death penalty in 66.7% of murder cases in which
the defendant was African American and the victim white, but that the same
prosecutors sought the death penalty in only 8% of cases involving other racial
combinations.41 Bell was an African American, his victim was white, and the trial
took place in Anderson County.42
The Fourth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
McClskey v Kerp, 3 in which the Court reiterated that an equal protection claim
must contain a showing of discriminatory intent and acknowledged that it had
previously found that statistics provided evidence of such intent in limited
contexts." InMcCYkey, however, the Supreme Court indicated its unwillingness
37. Id at 236. Apparently, Bell did not seek relief on Sixth Amendment grounds but only
sought an evidentiary hearing to develop the basis of those claims. Id at 234-35.




42. Bd 332 F.3d at 238.
43. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
44. BA 332 F.3d at 237 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 US. 279, 292-93 (1987)); see
McCfzkey, 481 US. at 292-93 (requiring a defendant to show discrminatory intent to prove an
equal protection violation and noting that, in the past, the Court found that statistics proved such
an intent). In Mc(Z4key, the Court required that a defendant allegin an equal protection violation
prove purposeful discrimination and conceded that "[t]he Court has accepted statistics as proof of
intent to discriminate in certain limited contexts." Mc(Clke 481 US. at 293. As a corollary to
proving discriminatory intent, the Court also found that a defendant needed to demonstrate a
discriminatory effect. Id at 292; see ahso United States v. Bass, 536 US. 862, 863-64 (2002) (per
curiam) (rejecting defendant's contention that a nationwide studyshowing United States Attorneys
sought the death penalty against African American defendants more frequently than white defen-
dants indicated selective rosecution because the study did not investigate equally situated defen-
dants and therefore co not prove a discriminatory effect); United States v. Armstrong, 517 US.
456, 465 (1996) (requiring a defendant to show policy had discriminatory intent and effect to
support selective prosecution claim under Equal Protection Clause). For a complete discussion of
Bass, see generally Kristen F. Grunewald, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 161 (2002) (analyzing United States v.
Bass, 122 S. Q. 2389 (2002)).
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to use statistics to establish discriminatory intent in death sentence decisions
because such statistics cannot reflect the complexity of those decisions." The
Court noted that such decisions are made by juries composed of vastlydifferent
makeups from one trial to the next. 6 Further, jury decisions rest on numerous
and varied factors and are not susceptible to subsequent inquiry because juries
are under no obligation to reveal the content of their deliberations.4" Moreover,
such decisions begin with the choice of the prosecutor to seek the death penalty
years before anycourt inquires into discriminatoryintent." Therefore, the Court
was unwilling to find that statistics indicated bias in a state's prior decisions to
seek the death penalty absent "exceptionally clear proof."49
In McCzkey, the Court also cited approvingly the Fourth Circuit's prior
decision in Shaw u Martini0 In Shazq the Fourth Circuit found that a study
indicating that South Carolina was more likely to seek the death penalty if the
victim was white than if the victim was African American did not constitute
proof of discrimination."1 The studywas inadequate because it included cases in
which the prosecutor could not seek the death penalty for lack of statutory
aggravating circumstances, it did not account for the relative atrocity of the
underlying facts in the cases, and it failed to account for other elements of
prosecutorial discretion. 2
The PCR court found that Eisenberg's study was flawed under McGizkey
and Shawbecause it did not consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
it did not consider other factors that might influence a prosecutor's charging
decision, and it included years prior to Ducworth's election. 3 Moreover, the
PCR court found that even if the study did create a prima facie showing of an
equal protection violation, such a showing was rebutted by Ducworth's testi-
mony.4 Ducworth explained that he charged Bell with capital murder because
of the strength of the evidence against him, the nature of the aggravating circum-
45. Mc(take% 481 U.S. at 294-97.
46. Id at 294.
47. Id at 296.
48. Id
49. Id at 297.
50. Id at 292 n.9; se Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 312, 314 (4th Ar. 1984) (deciding that
evidence that showed defendants in South Carolina received a death sentence more frequentlywhen
the victim was white than when the victim was African American was insufficient to establish an
equal protection claim).
51. Sh/M 733 F.2d at 314.
52. Id at 312-13.




stances, the part Bell played in the murder, and the wishes of the victim's survi-
vors.
55
The Fourth ircuit agreed with the PCR court that Eisenberg's study failed
to meet the high standard required of statistical evidence to show an Equal
Protection lause violation in the application of a state death penalty statute. 6
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that McCkeyand Shawconcemed studies that
sought to show defendants were unequally sentenced under a death penalty
statute across a state, while Eisenberg's study only focused on prosecutor's
decisions to charge a defendant in a particular county?5' Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit decided that the PCR court reasonably applied federal law when it relied
on those cases due to the deficiencies in the study and Ducworth's sufficient
explanation of his decision.8
D. Batson (aJle?
Bell contended that the State used a peremptory strike on an African
American juror solely because of her race in violation of Batson v Kagacy.s9
Batson requires a court to undergo a three-step analysis to determine if a prosecu-
tor used peremptory strikes for discriminatory reasons.' First, the defendant
must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution used its peremptory
challenges to remove a potential juror based on race.61 Second, the prosecution
must then provide a race-neutral explanation for its strikes.62 Finally, the judge
must "determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination."
63
During Bell's trial, one African American juror gave vacillating responses to
questions concerning her ability to apply the death penalty" These responses
were similar to an unchallenged white juror's responses. 5 Bell argued that the
prosecution's peremptory challenge of the African American juror indicated a
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id at 239 n.4.
58. d at 239.
59. Bd4 332 F.3d at 239; seBatson v. Kentucky, 476 US. 79, 92-95 (1986) (prohibiting a
state from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner and allowing a
defendant to show discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecution from the circumstances
surrounding juryselection in defendant's case without referencing priorpractice of the prosecution).
60. Bd4 332 F.3d at 239.
61. Batso, 476 U.S. at 96. Batson has been greatly expanded in its application SrJ.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 US. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that Barisn forbids gender-based peremptorystrikes).
62. Ba0n, 476 US. at 97.
63. Id at 98.




discriminatory intent.' On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that vacillating responses to death penalty questions would support the use
of a peremptory challenge and thereby rebut a Batson claim.67 Apparently, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina entirely failed to compare the two juror's
responses.6s In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Miller-El v CodzkV,69 the Fourth Circuit found the Supreme Court of South
Carolina's reasoning erroneous.' In Miller-El, the Supreme Court employed a
comparative juror analysis in determining the persuasiveness of a prosecutor's
race-neutral explanation of his peremptorystrikes.T1 Therefore, to the extent the
Supreme Court of South Carolina's decision did not compare the two jurors, the
Fourth Circuit found it contrary to federal law.72 However, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court of South Carolina also found no Batson violation
because the challenged juror indicated that due to her children, who were approx-
imatelyBell's age, she might have difficulty voting for death, whereas the seated
juror did not have similarly aged children.73 The Fourth Circuit found this
distinction between the jurors provided a sufficient reason to deny a Batson claim
under federal law.74
IV. Appiczion in Vbja
A. Miller-El
Bdeprovided the Fourth Circuit with its first opportunityto examine Batson
claims under the new framework of Mier-EL The Fourth Circuit noted that
Miller-El allows a defendant to use comparative juror analysis to rebut a prosecu-
tor's race neutral reasons for the use of peremptory strikes." The Fourth Cr-
cuit's application of comparative juror analysis was, however, extremely limited
because jurors who gave nearly identical answers in voir dire could be excluded
because of different backgrounds. 6 Therefore, while the Fourth Circuit ac-
knowledged the importance of comparative juror analysis in Bd, it did so in a
66. Id
67. Id at 241.
68. Id Because the prosecutor offered race neutral reasons for his exercise of peremptory
challenges, the court proceeded to the third prong of the analysis. Id
69. 537 US. 322 (2003).
70. Bd, 332 F.3d at 241; see Mliller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US. 322, 343 (2003) (employing
comparative analysis between jurors in determining whetherprosecutor struck juror for discrimina-
tory reasons).
71. Milr-E, 537 US. at 343.
72. Bd4 332 F.3d at 241.
73. Id at 241-42.
74. Id at 241.
75. See id (citing Miller-E4 537 US. at 343).
76. Id at 241-42.
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manner which is likely to be of little practical use given the scores of differences
between individuals which might justify striking one but not the other, i.e.
education, profession, experience and age.
The Fourth Qrcuit misinterpreted another important aspect of the Miller-El
holding. Miller-Elarose from a unique procedural historyin which the petitioner
first challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes under the pre-Batson
standard of Swuin v Alalhrmr Swun required a defendant to prove that a
prosecutor exercised peremptorystrikes in a discriminatorymanner over a period
of time prior to the defendant's trial to prove an equal protection violation. 8
Batson, however, allowed a defendant to base such an equal protection claim on
the prosecutor's behavior during voir dire in the defendant's trial, regardless of
the prosecutor's prior history 9 Miller-El, when it reached the Supreme Court,
included both Smin and Batson evidence."0 The Court in Miller-El undertook a
standard Batson analysis but also considered the Swuin evidence in the third part
of the Batson analysis." Bell produced Svtn evidence in the form of a study by
Dr. WilliamJacobyindicating that Ducworth's office historicallystruck a greater
percentage of eligible potential African American jurors than potential white
jurors.82 The Fourth Circuit decided that the state PCR court did not unreason-
ably decide that the statistics could only help Bell establish a rebuttable prima
facie case of discriminatoryuse of the strikes.83 Such a holding clearlymisinter-
prets the import of Miller-El, for the state PCR court should have considered the
evidence not as creating a rebuttable presumption, but as evidence to be weighed
against the prosecutor's explanations in the third step of the Baton analysis.
The most frustrating aspect of Batson has been the extreme difficulty a
defendant faces in succeeding in the third step of the Batson analysis. 4 Perhaps
77. Miler-E 537 U.S. at 328; seeSwain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (holding that
to prove an equal protection violation petitioner must "show the prosecutor's systematic use of
peremptory challenges against [blacks] over a period of time").
78. See Sain, 380 US. at 227 (stating that a petitioner must reference a prosecutor's
"systemic use of peremptory challenges against [blacks] over a period of time" to prove an equal
protection violation).
79. See Ba cm, 476 U.S. at 92-94 (allowing defendant to prove discriminatory intent behind
use of peremptory strikes by prosecutor from the circumstances surrounding the jury selection in
defendant's case without referencing the prior practice of the prosecution).
80. Miler-E, 537 US. at 328-31.
81. Se id at 338 (stating that "the question remaining is step three [of the Bamn analysis]").
The Court also stated that "[f]inally, in our threshold examination, we accord some weight to
petitioner's historical [Stinu] evidence of racial discrimination by the District Attorney's Office."
Id at 346.
82. Bdl, 332 F.3d at 242 n.8.
83. Id
84. In the reported cases, the prosecutor's race neutral reasons for exercising the peremptory
strike are almost always accepted. E.g, Barksdale v. Commonwealth, 438 S.E.2d 761,764 (Va. Q.
App. 1993) (crediting prosecutor's explanation of looking for younger people"); Winfield v.
2003]
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the greatest lesson to draw from Bed and Miller-El is the importance of creating
data on the manner in which the prosecution exercises its peremptorystrikes and
questions venire members during voir dire, both in the immediate trial and over
an extended period of time.85 Miller-El makes clear that both forms of evidence
can be used in the third step of the Batson analysis.86 Whereas Bell mainly relied
unsuccessfully on comparative juror analysis in his Batson claim, Miller-El pro-
duced detailed data of the prosecution's behavior during voir dire with consider-
able success."7 Therefore, such data appears to provide defense counsel with the
greatest hope of presenting a successful Batson challenge.
Moreover, MiUer-Elindicates that if regularlykept on a single prosecutor or
prosecutor's office over a long period of time, such data may have cumulative
value as Suin evidence in the third part of the Batson analysis. Although Bd!
implies that the Fourth Circuit is presently unwilling to consider historical
evidence in the third part of the Batson analysis, this practice directly contradicts
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miller-El. As a result, historical evidence will
probably be considered in the third part of the Batson analysis by courts in the
Fourth Circuit in the near future. Thus, counsel should consider assigning a
member of the defense team to take detailed notes of the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges and questioning of venire members during jury selection
and exchange such statistics with other defense counsel regarding individual
prosecutors and prosecutor's offices.
Commonwealth, 421 S.E2d 468,469,471-72 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc) (BentonJ., dissenting)
(finding no Batson violation when prosecution explained pattern of strikes on assumed basis of lack
of education).
85. Sw garally Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003)).
86. Seespa note 81 and accompanying text.
87. SeeMiler-E1, 537 U.S. at 331-33. Miller-El produced considerable Batson evidence. Id
He showed that peremptory strikes were used against 91% of African Americans eligible to serve
on the petit jury but against only 13% of non-African Americans eligible to serve on the petit jury.
Id at 331. Furthermore, his statistics showed a dramatic disparity in the manner in which the
prosecutor questioned African American and white jurors during voir dire. Id at 332. Before
asking 53% of prospective African American jurors whether they could vote for a death sentence,
the prosecutor recounted a detailed description of a state execution. Id In contrast, only 6% of
white jurors were given such a description before being asked a similar question. Id Furthermore,
the prosecutor informed 94% of white venire members of the minimum sentence under applicable
state law before asking them whether they felt they could apply it if theyfound the petitioner guilty.
Id at 333. The prosecutor provided the minimum statutorysentence to only 12.5% of the prospec-
tive African American jurors before asking them the same question. Id The Court, impressed with
the statistics, noted that "the statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the
prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors." Id at 342.
[Vol. 16:1
BELL V. OZMINT
B. Sdectiw P eaion
Bell also shows the substantial difficulties a petitioner will face in using
statistical studies to prove discriminatory intent in a prosecutor's charging
decisions. The Fourth Circuit's treatment of Eisenberg's studyindicates the near
impossibility of proving discriminatory selective prosecution through a study.
First, the court criticized the study for including years during that Ducworth was
not the district attorney." Next, the court found the studyunpersuasive because
it failed to compare murders of similar aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and did not account for other factors which may influence prosecutorial discre-
tion. 9 Consequently, defendants will have a difficult time compiling statistics
sufficient to show discrimination in prosecutorial charging decisions because
comparing murders of similar aggravating circumstances is a highly subjective
and uncertain task Is a murder committed after a rape comparable to a triple
shotgun slaying? Oris a murder during a convenience store robberycomparable
to an individual hiring an assassin to kill his or her spouse? Because so few
murders are actually comparable and the Fourth Circuit seems to prefer that a
study deal with a single prosecutor's office during a single head prosecutor's
tenure, defendants will not likely be able to compile a large enough data sample
on this topic to create meaningful statistics. Therefore, defendants will be hard
pressed to compile a study the Fourth Circuit would find persuasive under
McCilkey, Shawand Bell.
C JWyIssues
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected Bell's argument that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to support his claim that his right to a fair and impartial
jury was violated.' The Fourth Circuit did so on the ground that the applicable
state and federal rules of evidence, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, allowed juror testimonyto impeach a prior verdict onlyon a showing that
an outside influence corrupted the verdict.9 In Virginia, the rule allowing juror
testimony which impeaches a verdict is slightly different because the Supreme
Court of Virginia has declined to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence.92 "Gen-
erally, [Virginia courts] have limited findings of prejudicial juror misconduct to
88. Bd, 332 F.3d at 238.
89. Id
90. Id at 237.
91. Id; se Fulwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 682-83 (4th CAr. 2002) (granting evidentiary
hearing to a defendant who showed juror's husband influenced her to vote for death and that the
jury found out about defendant's prior trial and death sentence); Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP.
DEF. J. 189 (2002) (analyzing Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663 (4th Qr. 2002)).
92. See Jenkins v. Conmonwealth, 471 S.E.2d 785, 796 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (Benton, J.,
dissenting) ("The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, has not adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence as rules of evidence in Virginia.").
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activities of jurors that occur outside the jury room.9"" Applying this rule,
Virginia courts have frequentlydeclined to delve into allegations of improper jury
deliberations because the misconduct occurred inside the jury room." However,
some Virginia courts have also required an evidentiary hearing upon allegations
that the jury was exposed to some type of prejudicial information." Therefore,
the rule in Virginia is nuch broader than the rule applied in Bd, as a Virginia trial
court should investigate allegations that the jurors were exposed to some type of
prejudicial information orthat juror misconduct occurred outside the courtroom.
Had Bell's trial occurred in Virginia, the court might have granted Bell's request
for an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged juror misconduct because it
clearly took place outside the jury room. Counsel with a similarly situated defen-
dant should also seek to find some type of prejudicial information or influence
that was brought to bear on the jury to bring the claim under both parts of the
Virginia common law rule and further increase the chances of obtaining the
evidentiary hearing.
V. Caidmien
The most important aspect of this case is its application to Batson claims in
the wake of Mil1rEl The third step of the Batson analysis has long been a haven
in which prosecutors' explanations for prima facie showings of discrimination
have gone unchallenged. After Mier-El this haven may be breached, but Bell
implies it will not be done through comparative juror analysis alone. Rather,
counsel must increase the odds of success byseeking to compile and use statistics
of the prosecutor's behavior during voir dire, and, if available, similar statistics
from prior cases, to rebut the prosecution's explanations in the third part of the
Bason analysis.
Maxwell C Smith
93. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Bulvey, 353 S.E2d 747,751 (Va. 1987); seKasi v. Common-
wealth, 508 S.E.2d 57,67 (Va. 1998) (allowing jurors onlyto testify about prejudicial juror miscon-
duct that occurred outside of the jury room); Jenkins v. Commonweakh, 423 S.E.2d 360,370 (Va.
1992) (same).
94. Se Ki 508 SE2d at 67 (refusing to investigate contentions that jurors considered
defendant a terrorist during deliberations, despite judge's eplick orders to parties to not refer to
defendant as a terrorist, because those statements occurred within the jury room); Jenkim, 423
SE2d at 370 (declining to investigate allegations that juryimproperlyconsidered defendant's parole
eligibility during deliberations because such conduct occurred within the juryroom); QrwTpilar, 353
SE.2d at 751-52 (deciding trial court improperly found civil jury tainted when juror read magazine
article disparaging high jury verdicts in civil cases during deliberations because it happened in the
jury room and did not involve facts directly related to the tial).
95. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 408 Sl.2d 599,601-02 (Va. C. App. 1991) (holding that
trial court should have inquired into juryproceedings upon production of evidence that juror, who
was associated with department of conctions, explained parole system to jury); Evans-Smith v.
Commonwealth, 361 S.E2d 436,447-48 (Va. C. App. 1987) (holding that trial court should have
examined whether juror's consultation of an almanac that was not in evidence prejudiced the jury).
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